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: Multicast is the delivery of a message or information to a group of destination 
computers simultaneously in a single transmission from the source creating copies automatically 
in other network elements, such as routers, only when the topology of the network requires it. 
 Multicasting security is hard because of Open group membership, everyone gets same packets, 
Senders need not be members.  
 We first present taxonomy of multicast scenarios on the Internet and point out relevant security 
concerns. Next
 
we address two major security problems of multicast communication: source 
authentication, and key revocation. 
 Maintaining authenticity in multicast protocols is a much more complex problem than for unicast, 
in particular known solutions are prohibitively
 
inefficient in many cases. We present a solution 
that is reasonable for a range of scenarios. 
 Our approach can be regarded as a midpoint between traditional Message Authentication Codes 
and digital signatures. We also present an improved solution to the key revocation problem.
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Security Issues and Solutions in Multicast 
Environment through Tree based Scheme 
S.Santhi Priyaα, B.V.S.S.R.S.Sastry β, K. AkshithaΩ
Abstract- Multicast is the delivery of a message or information 
to a group of destination computers simultaneously in a single 
transmission from the source creating copies automatically in 
other network elements, such as routers, only when the 
topology of the network requires it. 
Multicasting security is hard because of Open group 
membership, everyone gets same packets, Senders need not 
be members.  
We first present taxonomy of multicast scenarios on the 
Internet and point out relevant security concerns. Next we 
address two major security problems of multicast 
communication: source authentication, and key revocation.  
Maintaining authenticity in multicast protocols is a much more 
complex problem than for unicast, in particular known 
solutions are prohibitively inefficient in many cases. We 
present a solution that is reasonable for a range of scenarios. 
Our approach can be regarded as a midpoint between 
traditional Message Authentication Codes and digital 
signatures. We also present an improved solution to the key 
revocation problem. 
Keywords- Multicast, Security, Authentication, 
Signature. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
he popularity of multicast has grown considerably 
with the wide use of the Internet. Examples include 
Internet video transmissions, news feeds, stock 
quotes, software updates, live multiparty conferencing, 
on-line video games and shared white – boards. Yet, 
Security threats on the Internet have flourished as well. 
Thus the need for secure and efficient multicast 
protocols is acute.   
Multicast security concerns are considerably 
more involved than those regarding point – to – point 
communication. Even dealing with the standard issues 
of message authentication and secrecy becomes much 
more complex; in addition other concerns arise, such  
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as access control, trust in group centers, dynamic 
group membership, and others. 
II.  Related work 
First, we present a taxonomy of multicast 
security concerns and scenarios, with a strong 
emphasis on IP multicast. It soon becomes clear that 
the scenarios are so diverse that there is little hope for a 
unified security solution that accommodates all 
scenarios. Yet we suggest two ‘benchmark’ scenarios 
that, besides being important on their own, have the 
property that solutions for these scenarios may be a 
good basis in other settings. 
In a nutshell, one scenario involves a single 
sender (say, an online stock-quotes distributor) and a 
large number of recipients (say, hundreds of 
thousands). The second scenario is on-line virtual 
conferencing involving up to few hundreds of 
participants, where many (or all) of the participants may 
be sending data to the group. 
Next we concentrate on a problem that 
emerges as a serious bottleneck in multicast security: 
source and message authentication. 
Known attempts to solve multicast security 
problems (e.g., [16], [22], [3], [28], [29], [21]) 
concentrate on the task of sharing a single key among 
the multicast group members. 
These solutions are adequate for encrypting 
messages so that only group members can decrypt. 
However, the single shared key approach is inadequate 
for source authentication, since a key shared among all 
members cannot be used to differentiate among 
senders in the group. In fact, the only known solutions 
for multicast authentication involve heavy use of public 
key signatures and these involve considerable 
overhead, especially in the work needed to generate 
signatures. 
We present solutions to the source 
authentication problem based on shared key 
mechanisms (namely, Message Authentication 
Codes— MACs), where each member has a different 
set of keys. We first present a basic scheme and then 
gradually improve it to a scheme that outperforms 
public-key signatures in several common scenarios. 
Our main savings are in the time to generate signatures.   
The basic source authentication scheme for a 
single sender draws from ideas of [2], [11]: the sender 
holds a set of keys and attaches to each packet MACs 
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– each MAC computed with a different key. Each 
recipient holds a subset of the keys and verifies the 
MAC according to the keys it holds. 
 We present several enhancements to this 
authentication scheme: _ A considerable gain in the 
computational overhead of the authentication scheme is 
achieved by noticing that the work needed for 
computing some known MAC functions on the same 
input and different keys is far less than the times the 
work to compute a single MAC. This is so since the 
message can first be hashed to a short string using 
key-less collision-resistant hashing. _ Using similar 
parameters to those of the basic scheme, one can 
guarantee that each good member has many keys that 
are known only to itself and to the sender. In order to 
break the scheme an adversary has to forge all the 
MACs computed with these keys. Thus it is enough that 
the sender attaches to the message only a single bit out 
of each generated MAC (as long as this bit cannot be 
successfully predicted without knowing the key – see 
elaboration within). Consequently, the total length of the 
tag attached to the message can be reduced to only 
bits. (Also, such MAC functions may be more efficient 
than regular MACs.)  A very similar method allows for 
many senders to use the same structure of keys — 
each sender will hold a different subset of keys, making 
sure that with high probability each sender recipient pair 
shares a sufficient number of keys that are not known to 
any (small enough) intruder.  It is further possible to 
increase security by making sure that no group of 
senders can forge messages, only large group of 
recipients can. This property is beneficial when the 
recipients are relatively trusted (say, these are network 
routers). It is achieved by differentiating between 
primary and secondary keys. A sender only receives 
secondary keys, while primary keys are only held by the 
recipients. Each secondary key is derived by applying a 
pseudorandom function (e.g., a block cipher or keyed 
hash), keyed by the corresponding primary key, to the 
senders public identity. Each recipient can now 
compute the relevant secondary keys and verify the 
MACs; yet, no partnership of senders knows even a 
single key other than its legitimate set of keys. 
Finally, we consider the membership revocation 
problem. When a member leaves a multicast group it 
might be required to change the group key in a way that 
the leaving member does not learn the new key. A 
relatively efficient solution to this problem has been 
recently proposed [28], [29]. We present an 
improvement to this solution, that saves half of the 
communication overhead. (When a new member joins, 
the group might have to be re-keyed as well, in order to 
prevent the joining member from understanding 
previous group communication. This is a much simpler 
task: the group controller simply multicasts the new key 
encrypted with the previous group key.) Organization. In 
Section II we list and discuss multicast security issues, 
in several common scenarios. In Section III we present 
our multicast authentication schemes, and in Section IV 
we present our improvements over past mechanisms 
for membership revocation. 
III. MULTICAST SECURITY ISSUES 
We overview salient characteristics of multicast 
scenarios, and discuss the relevant security concerns. 
The various scenarios and concerns are quite diverse in 
character (sometimes they are even contradictory). 
Thus it seems unlikely that a single solution will be 
satisfactory for all multicast scenarios. This situation 
leads us to suggest two benchmark scenarios for 
developing secure multicast solutions. 
Multicast group characteristics. We list salient 
parameters that characterize multicast groups. These 
parameters affect in a crucial way which security 
architecture should be used. The group size can vary 
from several tens of participants in small discussion 
groups, through thousands in virtual conferences and 
classes, and up to several millions in large broadcasts. 
Member characteristics include computing power (do 
all members have similar computing power or can 
some members be loaded more than others?) and 
attention (are members on-line at all times?). 
A related parameter is membership dynamics: 
Is the group membership static and known in advance? 
Otherwise, do members only join, or do members also 
leave? How frequently does membership change and 
how fast should changes become effective? Also, is 
there a membership control center that has information 
about group membership? Finally what is the expected 
life time of the group (several minutes/days)? Next, what 
is the number and type of  senders? Is there a single 
party that sends data? Several such parties? All parties? 
Is the identity of the senders known in advance? Are 
non-members expected to send data? 
Another parameter is the volume and type of 
traffic: Is there heavy volume of communication? Must 
the communication arrive in real-time? What is the 
allowed latency? For instance, is it data communication 
(less stringent real-time requirements, low volume), 
audio (must be real-time, low volume) or video (real-
time, high volume)? Also, is the traffic bursty? Another 
parameter that may become relevant is the routing 
algorithm used. For instance, a security mechanism 
may interact differently with dense-mode and sparse-
mode routing. Also, is all routing done via a single 
server or is it distributed? 
Security requirements. The most basic security 
requirements are secrecy and authenticity. Secrecy 
usually means that only the multicast group members 
(and all of them) should be able to decipher transmitted 
data. We distinguish two types of secrecy: Ephemeral 
secrecy means preventing non group-members from 
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easy access to the transmitted data. Here a mechanism 
that onlydelays access may be sufficient. Long-term 
secrecy means protecting the confidentiality of the data 
for a long period of time. This type of secrecy is often 
not needed for multicast traffic. 
Authenticity may take two flavours: Group 
authenticity means that each group member can 
recognize whether a message was sent by a group 
member. Source authenticity means that it is possible to 
identify the particular sender within the group. It may be 
desirable to be able to verify the origin of messages 
even if the originator is not a group member. Other 
concerns include several flavours of anonymity (e.g., 
Keeping the identity of group members secret from 
outsiders or from other group members, or keeping the 
identity of the sender of a message secret). A related 
concern is protection from traffic analysis. A somewhat 
contradictory requirement is non-repudiation, or the 
ability of receivers of data to prove to third parties that 
the data has been transmitted. Access control, or 
making sure that only registered and legitimate parties 
have access to the communication addressed to the 
group, is usually obtained by maintaining ephemeral 
secrecy of the data. Enforcing access control also 
involves authenticating potential group members. The 
access control problem becomes considerably more 
complex if members may join and leave with time. 
Lastly, maintaining service availability is ever more 
relevant in a multicast setting, since clogging attacks 
are easier to mount and are much more harmful. Here 
protection must include multicast-enabled routers as 
well as end-hosts. 
Trust issues. In simple scenarios there is a 
natural group owner that can be trusted to manage the 
group security. Typical roles are access control, logging 
traffic and usage, and key management. (It may be 
convenient, but not necessary, to identify the group 
owner with the core used in some multicast routing 
protocols, e.g. in [3].) In other cases no single entity is 
totally trusted; yet different entities can be trusted to 
perform different tasks (for instance, the access-control 
entity may be different than the entity that distributes 
keys). In addition, basing the security of the entire group 
on a single service makes the system more vulnerable. 
Thus it is in general beneficial to distribute the security 
tasks as much as possible. A natural approach for 
distributing trust in multicast security centres is to use 
threshold cryptography [9], [13] and proactive security 
[7] techniques to replace a single center with a 
distributed service with no single point of failure. This is 
an interesting topic for future research. 
Performance. Performance is a major concern 
for multicast security applications. The most immediate 
costs that should be minimized are the latency and 
work overhead per sending and receiving data packets, 
and the bandwidth overhead incurred by inflating the 
data packets via cryptographic  transformations. Secure 
memory requirement (e.g., lengths of keys) is a 
somewhat less important resource, but should also be 
minimized. Here distinction should be made between 
the load on strong server machines and on weak end-
users.  Other performance overheads to be minimized 
include the group management activity such as group 
initialization and member addition and deletion. Here 
member deletion may cause severe overhead since 
keys must be changed in order to ensure revocation of 
the cryptographic abilities of the deleted members. We 
elaborate in Section IV. An additional concern is 
possible congestion, especially around centralized 
control services at peak sign-on and sign-off times. (A 
scenario is a real-time broadcast where many people 
join right before the broadcast begin and leave right 
after it ends.) Another performance concern is the work 
incurred when a group member becomes active after 
being dormant (say, off-line) for a while. 
Benchmark Scenarios: As seen above, it takes 
many parameters to characterize a multicast security 
scenario, and a large number of potential scenarios 
exist. Each scenario calls for a different solution; in fact, 
the scenarios are so different that it seems unlikely that 
a single solution will accommodate all. This is in sharp 
contrast with the case of unicast security, where a 
single architectural approach (public-key based 
exchange of a key, followed by authenticating and 
encrypting each packet using derived keys) is sufficient 
for most scenarios. In this section we present two very 
different scenarios for secure multicast, and sketch 
possible solutions and challenges. These scenarios 
seem to be the ones that require most urgent solutions; 
in addition, they span a large fraction of the concerns 
described above, and solutions here may well be useful 
in other scenarios as well. Thus we suggest these 
scenarios as benchmarks for evaluating security 
solutions. 
Single source broadcast. Consider a single 
source that wishes to continuously broadcast data to a 
large number of recipients (e.g. a news agency that 
broadcasts news-feeds and stock-quotes to paying 
customers). Such applications are common in the 
Internet today, but they still typically rely on unicast 
routing and have few or no security protections. Here 
the number of recipients can be hundreds of thousands 
or even millions. The source is typically a top-end 
machine with ample resources. It can also be 
parallelized or even split into several sources in different 
locations. The recipients are typically lower-end 
machines with limited resources. Consequently, any 
security solution should be optimized for efficiency at 
the recipient side. Although the life-time of the group is 
usually very long group membership is typically 
dynamic: members join and leave at a relatively high 
rate. In addition, at peak times (say, before and after 
important broadcasts) a high volume of sign-on/sign-off 
requests are expected. The volume of transmitted data 
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may change considerably: if only text is being 
transmitted then the volume is relatively low (and the 
latency requirements are quite relaxed); if audio/video is 
transmitted (say, in on-line pay-TV) then the volume can 
be very high and very little latency is allowed. 
Authenticity of the transmitted data is a crucial 
concern and should be strictly maintained: a client must 
never accept a forged stock-quote as authentic. 
Another important concern is preventing non-members 
from using the service. This can be achieved by 
encrypting the data; yet the encryption may be weak 
since there is no real secrecy requirement, only 
prevention from easy unauthorized use. Regarding 
trust, here there is typically a natural group owner that 
manages access-control as well as key management. 
However, the sender of data may be a different entity 
(say, Yahoo! broadcasting Reuter’s news). A natural 
solution for this scenario may have a group 
management center that handles access control and 
key management. (To scale the solution to a larger 
number of recipients the center can be distributed, or a 
hierarchal structure can be introduced.) It is stressed 
that the center handles only control traffic. The data 
packets are routed using current multicast routing 
protocols. 
Encryption can be done using a single key 
shared by all members. Yet, two main cryptographic 
problems remain: How to authenticate messages and 
how to make sure that a leaving member loses its ability 
to decrypt. A simple and popular variant of this 
scenario, file transmission and updates, typically has 
static group membership and does not require on-line 
delivery of data. 
Virtual Conferences. Typical virtual  conference 
scenarios include on-line meetings of corporate 
executives or committees, town-hall type meetings, 
interactive lectures and classes, and multiparty video 
games. A virtual conference involves several tens to 
hundreds of peers, often with roughly similar 
computational resources. Usually most, or all, group 
members may a-priori wish to transmit data (although 
often there is a small set of members that generate 
most of the bandwidth). The group is often formed per 
event and is relatively short-lived. Membership is usually 
static: members usually join at start-up, and remain 
signed on throughout. Furthermore, even if a member 
leaves, cryptographically disconnecting it from the 
group is often not crucial. Bandwidth and latency 
requirements vary from application to application, 
similarly to the case of single source broadcast. 
Authenticity of data and sender is the most 
crucial security concern. In some scenarios maintaining 
secrecy of data and anonymity of members may be 
crucial as well; in many other scenarios secrecy of data 
is not a concern at all. Although there is often a natural 
group owner that may serve as a trusted center, it 
beneficial to distribute trust as much as possible. Also 
here a simple approach to a solution uses a server that 
handles access control and key management. 
Encryption, when needed, can be dealt with as above. 
Yet, the performance requirements from the 
authentication mechanism are very different. In 
particular, in contrast with the single sender scenario, 
here signing data packets may be prohibitively slow on 
the sender’s machine. In addition, there are far less 
receivers, and the group members may be somewhat 
more trustworthy. Virtual conferencing applications are 
also typically more tolerant to occasional and local 
authentication errors. These considerations point to an 
alternative approach to solving the multicast 
authentication problem. In the next section we describe 
this alternative approach. 
IV. EFFICIENT AUTHENTICATION 
SCHEMES 
We concentrate on two approaches to 
authentication: public key signatures, and MACs. (We 
do not address information authentication mechanisms, 
such as [10], [25], [6], which are inherently inefficient for 
groups of non-trivial size.) 
Public key signatures are perhaps the most 
natural mechanism for multicast authentication. Yet, 
signatures are typically long, and computing and 
verifying each signature requires a significant 
computational overhead. Applying signatures to 
authenticate streams of data was investigated in [14], 
who proposed a chaining mechanism that requires a 
single signature per stream. These constructions do not 
tolerate packet loss, and are thus incompatible with IP 
multicast. Alternatively, [30] suggested using tree-
based hashing to authenticate streams. This approach 
is a little less efficient, and incurs some latency, but it 
better tolerates packet loss. As an alternative to public 
key signatures, we propose an authentication method 
based on message  authentication codes (MACs). A  
AC is a function which takes a secret key k and a 
message M and returns a value MAC(k,M).  While 
MACs are typically much more efficient to generate and 
verify than digital signatures, they require that all 
potential verifiers have access to a shared key, k. This 
property makes 
MACs seemingly insufficient for achieving 
source authentication: any potential receiver who has 
the key k can “impersonate “the sender. We present 
new MAC-based authentication methods which achieve 
source authentication, and are more efficient than 
public key based authentication (especially in the time 
to generate signatures). We first present a description of 
a basic scheme, followed by several variants and 
improvements  We analyze the following salient 
resources for all the schemes we present: The running 
time required to authenticate a message and to verify 
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an authentication. The length of the keys that the 
authenticator and the verifier should store respectively. 
The length of the authentication message (the MAC or 
the signature). These resources are obviously related to 
the latency, secure memory and bandwidth overhead 
parameters discussed in Section II. 
Per-message unforgability of MAC schemes. 
We distinguish between two types of attacks against a 
MAC scheme. One is a complete break, where the 
attacker can authenticate any message of its choice 
(e.g., a key recovery attack). The other attack allows the 
attacker to randomly authenticate false messages; here 
the attacker can authenticate a given message with 
some fixed and small probability (but does not know a-
priori whether it will be able to authenticate the 
message). Our schemes do not allow complete break 
with higher probability than the underlying MAC 
scheme. Yet, we do allow for random authentication 
errors with non-negligible probability.   
a) The Basic Authentication Scheme for a Single 
Source  
Let w be the maximum number of corrupted users. The 
basic scheme proceeds as follows: 
• The source of the transmissions (S)  knows a 
set of  l = e(w+1). 
• Each recipient u knows a subset of keys . 
Every key k is included in R with probability 
1/(w+1) , independently. 
•  Message M is authenticated by S with each 
key k using a MAC and MAC(k,M) is 
transmitted together with the message. 
• Each recipient u verifies all the MACs which 
were created using the keys in its subset R.  
If any of these MACs is incorrect then u 
rejects the message. 
b) Smaller Communication Overhead 
We now describe a scheme with a lower 
communication overhead. The idea behind it is that 
using just four times as many keys as in the basic 
scheme, one can ensure that the partner does not know 
log(1/q) of the user’s keys. Each key can therefore be 
used to produce a MAC with a single bit output and the 
communication overhead is improved. The partner 
would have to guess log(1/q) bits to create a false 
authentication and its probability of success is as 
before. 
c) Multiple Dynamic Sources 
The schemes presented above can be easily 
extended to enable any party to send authenticated 
messages. The global set of l keys is w+1 times bigger 
than in the single source scheme, and every party 
receives a random subset R of these keys. Keys are 
included R independently at random with probability 
1/w+1. When a party u sends a message, it 
authenticates it with all the keys in R, and every 
receiving party v verifies the authentications that were 
performed with the keys . It is straightforward to verify 
that the resulting schemes are as secure as the single 
source schemes. Note that the  (average) 
communication and computation overheads are not 
changed. The mapping of users to subsets can be 
done with a public (w+2) -wise independent hash 
function. 
Following, we present a better method which 
supports a dynamic set of sources and has the 
following properties: 
• The total number of keys is as in schemes for a 
single source, but every party can send 
authenticated messages. 
• The scheme does not require the set of 
sources to be defined in advance or to contain 
all parties. Rather, it allows to dynamically add 
sources. 
• The scheme distinguishes between the set of 
sources and the set of receivers. Only group of 
more than w receivers can send false 
authenticated messages. The keys of sources 
do not help such groups. This property is 
especially useful if receivers are more trusted 
than senders, as might be the case for 
example if the receivers are network routers. 
• The scheme provides a computational (rather 
than information theoretic) security against 
revealing to a group all the keys in the 
intersection of a source and receivers subsets. 
The scheme uses a family of pseudo-random 
functions (see [20] for a discussion of pseudo-random 
functions). It is based on a single source scheme and 
can be built upon the basic scheme we described in 
Section III-A or the communication efficient scheme of 
Section III-B. 
Initialization: The scheme uses l primary keys, Where l is 
as in the single source schemes      (l = O (wlog 
(1/q)).Each key k defines a pseudo-random function f. 
Receiver Initialization: Each party v which intends to 
receive messages obtains a subset R of primary keys. 
Every primary key k is included in R with probability 
(1/w+1). 
Source Initialization: Every party u which wishes to send 
messages receives a set of secondary keys S = (f(u)). 
This set can be sent any time after the system has been 
set-up, and the identity or the number of sources does 
not have to be defined in advance. 
Message Authentication: When a party u sends a 
message M it authenticates it with all the secondary 
keys in S. That is, it computes and attaches a MAC of M 
with k. Every receiving party v computes all the 
secondary keys of u with primary key in R.  It then 
verifies all the MACs which were computed using these 
keys. The number of keys which are used and stored is 
as in the single source scheme. The work of the 
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sources is as in the previous schemes, and receivers 
only have the additional task of evaluating f to compute 
a secondary key for each of the primary keys in their 
subset.  
A very useful property of this scheme is that it 
enables a dynamic set of sources. New parties can be 
allowed to send authenticated messages by giving 
them a corresponding set of secondary keys. Another 
useful property of the scheme is that the set of sources 
can be separated from the set of receivers, and no 
group of sources can break the security. It also enables 
to give sources dedicated keys for authenticating 
different messages. 
An attractive application of these properties is 
to give the source which is designated to broadcast at 
time T the set of secondary Keys f(T) , and require it to 
use them to authenticate its broadcast at that time. This 
approach ensures that sources can only send 
information to the group in their designated time slots. 
d) Signatures vs. MACs: a rough performance 
comparison 
Compared to the performance of public key 
signatures, our authentication schemes dramatically 
reduce the running time of the authenticator. The 
running time of the verifier and the communication 
overhead are of the same order as public key 
signatures (the exact comparison depends on the size 
of the corrupt groups against which the schemes 
operate). 
Furthermore, we believe that more efficient 
MACs could be designed for our authentication 
schemes. In particular, these MAC functions would 
make use of the fact that they can have a single bit 
output, and would have small amortized complexity (for 
evaluations of the function on the same input and many 
keys). Authentication schemes based on such functions 
should be considerably more efficient than schemes 
based on HMAC.  
 
Table1: Performance Comparision Of Authentication 
Schemes 
 
Table I compares the overhead of RSA and 
DSS signatures to the overhead of the suggested 
authentication schemes with some specific parameters. 
The communication overhead of the basic and 
improved schemes are based on using only 10 bits out 
of each MAC. 
The table describes the number of 
authentications and verifications that can be performed 
per second, the communication overhead in bits, and 
the length of the key used by the source and the 
receivers. The first two rows are for RSA and DSS 
signatures. The third row provides an estimate for our 
basic authentication scheme. Next we present the 
performance of the communication efficient variant, in 
which each MAC has a single bit output. Last is the 
performance of a scheme which guarantees that no 
group knows all the keys of any user (its overhead 
seems too large to justify its use). 
It is seen that the signing time is much shorter 
in our scheme than with public key signatures. The 
verification time is comparable to (highly optimized) 
RSA and much faster than DSS.  
V.  DYNAMIC SECRECY 
Secret group communication can be achieved 
by encrypting messages with a group key. This raises 
the question of how to add or remove users from the 
group. When a new member joins the group, the 
common key can be sent to the new member using 
secure unicast. Alternatively, if the previous 
communications should be kept secret from the new 
user, a new common key can be generated and sent to 
the old group members (encrypted with the old 
common key) and to the new member (using secure 
unicast). User deletion is more problematic. Obviously, 
it is not enough to just ask members who leave the 
group to delete their group key, and it is essential to 
change the key with which group communication is 
encrypted in order to conceal future communications 
from former group members. This problem is known as 
user revocation or blacklisting, and is particularly 
important in applications like pay-per-view in which only 
paying customers should be allowed to receive 
transmissions. 
We survey some solutions for the member 
deletion problem, describe a particularly appealing 
construction from [28], [29] based on binary trees, and 
present an improved construction with reduced 
communication overhead. We also show how our 
construction is more resistant to a certain kind of attack. 
a) Some User Revocation Schemes 
A trivial solution for the member revocation 
problem is for each group member to share a individual 
secret key with a center which controls the group. When 
a member is deleted from the group, the center 
chooses a new common key to encrypt future multicast 
messages, and sends it to every group member, 
encrypted with the respective individual secret keys. 
This solution does not scale up well since a group of n 
members requires a key renewal message with n-1 new 
keys. 
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A more advanced solution was suggested by 
Mittra [22]. It divides the multicast group into subgroups 
which are arranged in a hierarchical structure and each 
has a special group controller. The user revocation 
overhead is linear in the size of a subgroup. However, 
this solution introduces group controllers in every 
subgroup which form many possible points of failure, 
both for availability and for security. 
There are also suggestions to use public key 
technology, namely generalized Diffie-Hellman 
constructions, to enable communication efficient group 
re-keying (e.g. [27]). However, for a group of n 
members these suggestions require O(n) 
exponentiations. For most applications this overhead is 
far too high to be acceptable in the near future.  
b) A Tree Based Scheme 
Tree based group rekeying schemes were 
suggested by Wallner et al. [28] (who used binary 
trees), and independently by Wong et al. [29] (who 
consider the degree of the nodes of the tree as a 
parameter). We concentrate on the scheme of [28] 
since it requires a smaller communication overhead per 
user revocation. 
This scheme applied to a group of n users 
requires each user to store log(n+1) keys. It uses a 
message with 2logn-1 key encryptions in order to delete 
a user and generate a new group key. This process 
should be repeated for every deleted user. The scheme 
has better performance than the Fiat-Naor scheme 
when the number of deletions is not too big. It is also 
secure against any number of corrupt users (they can 
all be deleted from the group, no matter how many they 
are). A drawback of this scheme is that if a user misses 
some control packet relative to a user deletion 
operation (e.g., if it temporarily gets disconnected from 
the network), it needs to either ask for all the missed 
control packets, or incur in a communication  overhead 
comparable to a user addition operation. 
The group is initialized as follows. Users are 
associated to the leaves of a tree of height log n (see 
Figure 1). The group controller associates a key k to 
every node of the tree, and sends to each user (through 
a secure channel) the keys associated to the nodes 
along the path connecting the user to the root.  Notice 
that the root key k is known to all users and can be 
used to encrypt group communications. 
 
Figure 1: The Tree key data structure 
 
Figure 2:  key revocation in the basic scheme 
 
In order to remove a user u from the group, the 
group controller performs the following operations. For 
all nodes v along the path from u to the root, a new key 
k is generated. All encryptions are sent to the users as 
shown in Figure 2.  
c) The Improved Scheme 
The improved scheme reduces the 
communication overhead of [28] by a factor of two, 
from 2 log n to only log n. The initialization of the 
scheme is the same as in [28]. We now describe the 
user revocation procedure. Let G be pseudo-random 
generator which doubles the size of its input [5]. Denote 
by L(x), R(x) the left and right halves of the output of 
G(x) i.e., G(x) =L(x) R(x) where |L(x)| =|R(x)| = |x|. 
To remove a user u , the group controller associates a 
value r to every node v along the path from u to the root. 
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Figure 3:  key revocation in the improved scheme 
 
Advantages of the new scheme: This construction 
halves the communication overhead of the basic 
scheme to only log n, and its security can be rigorously 
proven. It has an additional advantage: In the scheme 
of Wallner et al the group controller chooses the group 
key (the root key), whereas is our construction this key 
is the output of a pseudo-random generator. Suppose 
that there is an adversary which can break encryptions 
performed with a subset of the key space (for example 
keys in which certain bits have a linear dependency), 
and furthermore that this adversary has gained 
temporary control over the group controller (e.g. when 
the controller was manufactured). 
Then if the scheme of [28] is used, the  
adversary might corrupt the method by which the group 
controller generates keys in such a way that the root key 
would always be chosen from the “weak” subspace. 
However, if our scheme is used, and the pseudo-
random generator G(x) = L(x)R(x) is cryptographically 
strong, then it will be hard to find values r such that the 
root key k = L(R(R(….(r)….) is weak.  
Independently, McGrew and Sherman [21] 
have presented a tree based rekeying scheme which 
has the same overhead as ours. However, the security 
of their scheme is based on non-standard 
cryptographic assumptions and is not rigorously 
proven. In comparison, the security of our scheme can 
be rigorously proven based on the widely used 
assumption of the existence of pseudo-random 
generators [5]. 
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